The Problem of Evil: If God Exists, Why Is There Suffering?

If God is good, why is there so much suffering?

Most of us have probably sought explanations for suffering in light of our faith in God, or else evil may have contributed to our doubts about God’s existence. If you have spent any extended amount of time thinking about these questions, you are exploring the problem of evil, a term that refers to analyzing challenges that the existence of evil causes for various religions.

What is the problem of evil? Technically, we would do well to speak of multiple problems of evil. Each religion may face unique challenges (is karmic suffering really just, as Hinduism suggests? Is evil an illusion, as some Buddhists claim?), but this article will consider the problem of evil in Christianity in three forms.

1. The logical problem of evil is a philosophical attempt to argue that a theistic God cannot exist if evil exists.
2. The evidential problem of evil argues that a specific kind or example of evil makes God’s existence improbable.
3. The existential problem of evil names the experiences that a sufferer wrestles with which might undermine faith in God.
   

This article will briefly consider how Christians respond to these problems and will evaluate responses against Scripture. Though the problem of evil is one of the bigger challenges to Christian faith, my hope is that this brief article shows that it need not destroy Christian faith in God or abolish hope in his defeat of evil.

1. The logical problem of evil

The logical problem of evil argues that it is logically impossible for God to exist if evil exists. Technically, there are a variety of logical problems of evil, each moving from a particular characterization of God to the argument that evil entails God does not exist as so characterized.¹

Consider an example of the logical problem of evil. We might encounter the following argument:

1. If God exists, God is perfect Creator.
2. A perfect Creator would not decrease the perfection of the world by creating.
3. Evil is an imperfection that exists in the world.
4. The world’s perfection would have decreased if God’s act of creating added evil, an imperfection, to the perfect existence of God.
5. Therefore, a perfect Creator God must not exist.² Or so this argument goes.

There are four common approaches to challenging a logical problem of evil, assuming the argument contains no logical fallacy. I will illustrate each by returning to the problem of evil based on God being perfect Creator.

1. We might object to the characterization offered. Perhaps God is not a perfect Creator, so the argument fails. But this strategy will not work for our sample argument given the clear teaching of Scripture which depicts God as perfect Creator (e.g., Gen 1–2).
2. We might object to the “generic theism” of most logical problems of evil. Typically, the arguments name a few divine attributes but without much theological analysis. Perhaps a theologically robust explanation of creation or of perfection defeats the argument.³ For example, if perfection requires God to maximize his glory, then perhaps creating a world with sin will allow God’s glory to be better displayed through his defeat of evil than would creating a world without evil. God is a perfect Creator, so he creates a world that maximizes the display of his glory.
3. We might object to one of the premises of the argument. In this case, the argument claimed that the world diminished in perfection when God created a world capable of evil. However, this assumes that God is part of “the world,” which does not adequately express the transcendence of a God who exceeds space, time, matter, and so forth. God did not diminish the perfection of the world. There was no world, and then God created one.
4. Finally, we might object to the starting point of the argument.⁴ Why not begin with the premise that a perfect Creator would have a good reason to create a world capable of evil? This premise, with the observation that our world has evil, would lead us to conclude that there must be a good reason for this world to have evil.

Each of these examples could produce an extended debate of arguments and counterarguments. However, the basic strategies show you how to address the logical problem of evil in any form.

The most well-known and discussed forms of the problem of evil begin by characterizing God as all powerful and all good. This version was used by David Hume and others, but in modern philosophy it is associated with J. L. Mackie. Mackie poses the problem as follows:

According to traditional theism, there is a god who is both omnipotent (and omniscient) and wholly good, and yet there is evil in the world. How can this be? … If we add the at least initially plausible premises that good is opposed to evil in such a way that a being who is wholly good eliminates evil as far as he can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do, then we do have a contradiction. A wholly good omnipotent being would eliminate evil completely; if there really are evils, then there cannot be any such being.⁵

Each of the four strategies listed above has been used against Mackie’s argument, but the following two objections are the most famous. Each criticizes one of Mackie’s premises.

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The soul-making theodicy

A theodicy is a defense of God in light of the problem of evil that explains why he is justified in allowing evil. The soul-making theodicy denies that a wholly good God would eliminate all evil, for evil serves some good purpose. This approach explains that struggle, suffering, and other evils are necessary to mold souls into their highest form.

John Hick offers the most famous soul-making theodicy. He appeals to Irenaeus of Lyons, arguing that a proper theological view of creation is one in which evil and good are mixed to provide an opportunity for human spiritual and moral advancement.⁶ Hick explains how things that we call evil are important for our personal growth. Physical pain is important for biological purposes, helping us to avoid danger but also serving to develop our ability to navigate our environment. Without the pains associated with hunger or exposure to the elements, we would have no need to work to develop our minds or invent technologies.⁷ Suffering of all kinds prompts us to love others, for the highest form of love requires bearing one another’s burdens.⁸ Similarly, suffering prompts us to develop virtues like courage and justice. These outcomes justify God allowing evil to exist, Hick claims.

There is some limited evidence for the soul-making theodicy in Scripture. There are clear biblical examples where God has turned evil into good outcomes (famously, Gen 50:20). Much of the support for the soul-making theodicy is found in Paul, though we will find that such biblical support is incomplete.

Often Christians appeal to Romans 8:28 in a manner that mirrors the soul-making theodicy: “And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose” (Rom 8:28). This verse could suggest that everything that happens is for our good in the end. However, this might be an over-ambitious interpretation, for “all things” could refer to all kinds of things, and not universally to each individual thing. For example, when 1 Corinthians 2:15 says the spiritual man understands all things, it does not imply omniscience, and Colossians 1:20’s claim that Christ reconciles all things to God may not indicate universal salvation.

As we turn to consider Paul’s theology more broadly, we see that Paul presents two varieties of suffering:⁹

• Redemptive suffering brings about spiritual benefits as we share the sufferings of Christ (2 Cor 1:5; Phil 3:10).
• Tragic suffering is depicted as an enemy (1 Cor 15:26) and contrasted with our future hope (Rom 8:18).

It is wise to be cautious. Paul appeals to human sin as the ultimate explanation of death and suffering (Rom 5:12). Whatever redemptive suffering exists is because God’s work accompanies suffering, but it is likely going too far to make suffering, as such, redemptive.¹⁰ Only God saves, and part of his saving work is defeating suffering and death as evils depicted in Pauline literature as tragic.

The biblical support for the soul-making theodicy, then, is limited, given that there is no evidence that all evil is intended for or used for human good. This alone is a serious critique of the soul-making theodicy. But I will consider two further concerns (though the debate is far more expansive):

1. The soul-making theodicy relies on a consequentialist ethic where the end justifies the means. Yet, Christian ethicists usually reject doing evil actions to produce a good result. At the very least, we could ask whether the soul-making theodicy’s ethical assumptions align with what the Bible teaches about God’s character and ethics.
2. The soul-making theodicy instrumentalizes people. Rather than the well-being of a sufferer being a goal, that sufferer becomes a means to the well-being of others who might develop character in response to the sufferer.¹¹

One of the biggest objections to the soul-making theodicy asks why evils of the magnitude of the bubonic plague or Auschwitz were necessary. Why did God need to use such severe suffering to bring about our moral formation?¹² In the end, the soul-making theodicy drives us to consider the evidential problem of evil.

The free will defense

The second famous response to Mackie’s version of the problem of evil is the free will defense (or theodicy). This response rejects the premise that an omnipotent God could eliminate all evil if God also wanted to create a world with free persons in it. It argues that free will includes the possibility of evil, but the goods that arise from free will justify the suffering that accompanies it.

Augustine of Hippo is associated with the free will theodicy, which argues that free will is the reason why God allows evil to exist.¹³ Alvin Plantinga is associated with the free will defense, which does not claim to know why God allows evil with certainty. Instead, it merely attempts to show that free will could be a justifiable reason for God to allow evil, thereby defeating Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil.

According to Plantinga, omnipotence only means that God can create possible worlds, i.e., those worlds that can logically or actually exist. God could not create impossible worlds, for example, where triangles had four sides.¹⁴ Plantinga considers the idea of “transworld depravity,” which refers to a condition where a person would be significantly free and would do moral wrong with respect to some act in all possible worlds. If transworld depravity is an essential or necessary property of all truly free human beings, then it would not be possible for God to create a world with free human beings that included no evil.¹⁵ Any world with free humans would include sin and evil. Plantinga does not insist that transworld depravity is true, but the possibility that it is true is sufficient to show one logically possible reason why God might allow evil.

Freedom is important to bring about moral goods like love and the virtues, so it may be that freedom is good enough to justify God creating a world in which evil arises from free will. This would refute Mackie’s claim that an omnipotent God could fully eliminate evil by providing one possible reason why this may not be the case.

At this point, the observant reader might remember the moral objections to the soul-making defense, where a good outcome may not justify the means. Does this concern apply to the free will defense? The free will defense and the soul-making theodicy are slightly different. The soul-making theodicy suggests that God uses evil for good purposes, claiming that evil is thereby justified. The free will defense says that God causes something good, which has an inescapable evil associated with it. In the free will defense, God is not using evil to bring about good. Rather, he is causing good which unavoidably results in humans causing evil.¹⁶

Philosophically, the free will defense is largely seen as a successful response to Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil. It shows one logically consistent explanation for why an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God would allow evil.

Is the free will defense biblical? In one sense, the answer must be no, for the Bible nowhere says that the good of free choice explains why God permits evil. However, in a more broad sense, the biblical narrative fits the free will defense. Genesis 3 depicts sin entering creation through the choice of Adam and Eve, and Romans 5:12–21 depicts evils like sin and death as the result of the one sin of Adam. The doctrine of original sin could fit with the free will defense. Since we are only considering a defense, which poses a possible answer, and not a theodicy that claims certainty, this may suffice.

Some object to the theology of freedom that Plantinga uses, which is overtly libertarian in a manner rejected by some theologians. In other words, humans are free with respect to an act if they are able to do or not do an act.¹⁷ Many traditional understandings of the doctrine of sin deny this power with respect to evil actions. However, while many Protestants would deny that humans have libertarian freedom with respect to sin today, most would allow the possibility that Adam was able to avoid sin.

A second objection to Plantinga focuses on natural evil. Moral evil arises from free human action, but natural evils like earthquakes or plagues apparently come from features of the universe, not from human choices. A robust narrative of the fall may link natural evil to the moral evil of Adam’s sin (as in Rom 5:17 and 8:20–21), but Plantinga also explains that natural evil might arise from demonic freedom. That possibility alone suffices to fit natural evil with the free will defense, even if the ultimate explanation for natural evil is different.¹⁸ By considering specific varieties of evil, we are again being drawn to consider the evidential problem of evil.

Anti-theodicy

Finally, we must consider those who object to theodicy altogether. Anti-theodicy is an approach that rejects the quest to identify explanations for evil and suffering altogether.

In part, this approach emerges because of pastoral problems that can arise from theodicies. Some theologians have argued that theodicy is problematic and should be avoided. For example, John Swinton names three problems that emerge from theodicy. Theodicies can:

1. “Rationalize evil”: For example, the soul-making theodicy might lead us to accept an injustice as a necessary part of our moral improvement rather than something to resist.
2. “Silence the voice of the sufferer”: When someone is given an explanation for their suffering, they might feel as if they cannot grieve or express anger, leading them to bottle up their emotions.
3. “Become evil in themselves”: If evil is rationalized or sufferers are silenced, it may cause more suffering, adding evil to evil.¹⁹

It may be sufficient to recognize that theodicy is not appropriate for the existential problem of evil, when suffering is personal. In such contexts, abstract philosophical answers can cause the problems Swinton identifies. If you are asked why God allows evil, it would be wise to seek some context for the question rather than offer a quick theodicy that may face Swinton’s three problems. Because of the potential harms of theodicy, others object to using theodicy in any context, insisting on anti-theodicy.

The Bible may provide further reasons for anti-theodicy. For instance, advocates of anti-theodicy often appeal to the book of Job to explain their concerns. Job’s assertions are fairly consistent throughout the book. God has caused Job’s suffering (e.g., Job 9–10; 19:7–9) and Job claims innocence (e.g., Job 9:21; 27:5–6). Job laments that the human plight is misery (e.g., Job 7:1–10; 12:5–25; 14:1–6). Yet Job’s “expressives change remarkably.” He begins with cursing (Job 3:1) but soon moves from this to increasing expressions of hope (e.g., Job 16:18–17:1).²⁰ Job also shifts from calling for a neutral arbiter (Job 9:33) to seeking a witness to verify his innocence (Job 16:19), to finally asking for a defender or avenger who shall facilitate Job seeing God (Job 19:25–27).²¹

In other words, Job has taken advantage of a unique opportunity not evident in many other religions. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, dispute with God was permitted, not met with instant divine judgment.²² In fact, given the presence of psalms of lament and imprecatory psalms in the canon, Jews and Christians were encouraged to voice their anger, grief, despair, and frustration to God. Perhaps the main lesson from Job is that continuing honest communication with God is more important than offering a logical explanation for suffering.

2. The evidential problem of evil

Where the logical problem of evil argues that it is impossible for God to co-exist with evil, the evidential problem of evil makes more meager claims. It merely argues that certain kinds of evil make God’s existence improbable.

The argument of Paul Draper will illustrate the problem well. Draper considers three basic kinds of evil:

1. Moral agents experience biologically useful pain (e.g., pain that helps life survive by alerting of danger). Draper says God would need a moral reason for this pain, such as pain building character in the soul-making defense. After all, he could create life that did not need pain. He argues this pain is more likely to emerge from an indifferent universe than from a good God.
2. Non-moral agents also experience biologically useful pain. Draper says this would be probable in an evolutionary universe, but since there could be no moral benefit to this pain (non-moral agents don’t have character to build), this would be unlikely in a universe made by God.
3. Sentient beings experience pain that is not biologically useful. Draper says that both theism and an indifferent universe could explain this pain fairly easily.

Draper concludes that the “hypothesis of indifference,” that the universe is a product of impersonal forces, is a more probable hypothesis given the existence of these three kinds of pain.²³

Responses to the evidential problem of evil

There are two basic strategies Christians use to respond to the evidential problem of evil.

Offensive strategies typically make a case for the existence of God that can counterbalance the evidential problem of evil by providing evidence that God’s existence is probable.²⁴ For example, pain may make theism less probable, but the complexity of the universe may make theism more probable through the teleological argument.

Defensive strategies merely attempt to show that a given evidential argument is not successful in showing that theism is improbable. One defensive strategy focuses on arguing that human beings are unlikely to know the reasons why God might allow certain pains or evils, which makes it impossible to determine the probability that God might allow a specific kind of evil. One such defensive strategy is named skeptical theism. If we affirm that God exceeds human understanding (e.g., Isa 55:8–9; 1 Cor 2:11), then we do not have reason to think that we would always understand why God allows certain kinds of evil. Thus, probabilistic arguments are unreliable.²⁵

Theodicy and the cross

One theological response to the evidential problem of evil focuses on the cross.

Marilyn McCord Adams has focused on what she calls “horrendous evils”: those extreme instances of suffering like brutal torture which make it doubtful that a person’s life could be good for them overall.²⁶ While one might appeal to the good of free will to explain why creation, on a global scale, is better off with evil than without, to the person who suffers horrendous evil the benefits of suffering on a global scale may seem irrelevant to the catastrophic suffering experienced.

In response to such situations, Adams focuses on how “God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself” (2 Cor 5:19). In the incarnation, the Son was subjected to the horrendous evil of betrayal, bodily torture, public humiliation, and grave injustice. By identifying with such “ruinous” suffering, God “integrates” such suffering “into the participant’s relationship with God.” Not even horrendous evil can cause separation from God (Rom 8:31–39). Our personal relationship with God culminates in our seeing him face to face, an “incommensurate good.”²⁷

Through the cross, no evil is capable of making a life impossible to redeem.

The crucifixion does not mean that horrendous evils are a good or necessary thing for encountering God, but it does mean that God enters even the worst forms of suffering to allow us to encounter him as a perfect good that can heal all wounds. Through the cross, no evil is capable of making a life impossible to redeem—which brings us finally to the existential problem of evil.

3. The existential problem of evil

Both logical and the evidential forms of the problem of evil are philosophical, but the existential problem of evil is a more personal and spiritual problem. This version of the problem of evil describes the experience of someone who doubts God’s existence or experiences anger toward God or hopelessness as a result of suffering or of witnessing someone else’s suffering. Because it is so personal, the existential problem of evil should be treated differently than the logical and evidential problems.

In the above discussion of anti-theodicy, we considered John Swinton’s list of problems that theodicy may cause. These problems are especially likely in the context of the existential problem of evil. The point should be obvious if you imagine visiting a friend whose child just died of leukemia and offering them a syllogism explaining the free will defense. However, we may not always recognize the personal reasons that may lead someone to express the problem of evil.

Given these concerns, John Swinton advocates developing a “practical theodicy,” an approach which fosters practices of hope and healing with a goal of restoring “right relationship with God, self, and others.”²⁸ Such theodicy may not explain why evil happens as much as provide opportunities for faith to persist despite suffering, grief, or pain.

Lament and evil

One example of practical theodicy is lament, a genre in Scripture, represented especially by the Psalms and Lamentations, through which grief, doubt, pain, and other emotions are expressed to God.

Lament can provide a practical help against evil because it gives voice to the community’s grief, names horrors and trauma in a way that calls for justice, and fosters hope for restoration.²⁹ When churches provide spaces for lament through regular Sunday worship, grief support groups, memorial services, and in pastoral counseling, the expression of lament can be a means of healing or a way to gather support for the pursuit of justice.

How not to respond to suffering

While the theological framework of the cross may help us think about evil conceptually, we must be careful regarding how we use such conceptual frameworks. When someone is having a traumatic experience, four common responses may shut down grief and close off the sorts of open communication with God that the book of Job encourages. Undermining grief may cause more long-term trauma, so it is best to avoid:

1. Trivialization: minimizing an experience of suffering or evil by downplaying pain or emotional struggle (e.g., “It’s not as bad as it seems”)
2. Particularization: treating the harm experienced by the sufferer as less important or serious than other kinds of pain (e.g., “It could be worse”)
3. Spiritualization: offering a spiritual slogan that prevents grieving (e.g., “Just bear your cross”)
4. Universalization: reducing a specific loss or harm to a general human experience (e.g., “We all suffer in our own ways”)³⁰

Though each person and conversation is different, often these responses prevent healthy grieving or expressions of pain in a manner that could cause long-term problems. Avoiding these patterns contributes to a helpful practical theodicy.

Conclusion

The problem of evil in its various forms is one of the more substantive challenges to the Christian faith. This survey of the problem in its three forms certainly does not exhaust the conversation, but it does show viable Christian responses that prevent the problem of evil from destroying Christian faith.

Several basic strategies for responding to specific versions of the logical problem of evil are fruitful in defending Christian convictions, and the soul-making theodicy and free will defense make progress in explaining why God might allow evil, though in the end anti-theodicy may be a wiser approach. The evidential problem of evil faces serious problems in its methodology, particularly its assumption that we would understand God’s reasons for anything.

In the end, most of our attention should be directed toward the existential problem of evil—the personal sufferings we face daily—as we seek to support those who grieve without further harming them through unwise appeals to theodicy. Our response to evil must therefore be guided by the Spirit who gives wisdom to discern when to offer a rational answer and when to join in lament with those who suffer.

Share your thoughts

What is the best response to the problem of evil? Join us in the Word by Word group to share your thoughts.

Glenn Butner’s suggested resources for further study

Meister, Chad. Evil: A Guide for the Perplexed. Second edition. Bloomsbury, 2018.

Additional resources

Related content

• What Is Evil—Biblically? What the Bible Says about Good & Evil
• Why Do Good People Do Bad Things? The Problem of Free Will
• From Genesis to Judgment: Original Sin Fully Explained
• What Is Sin? Is Your Definition Missing the Mark?
• Christian Apologetics: Truth, Love, and Faith Conversations

1. Graham Oppy, “Logical Arguments from Evil and Free-Will Defenses,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil, ed. Chad Meister and Paul K. Moser (Cambridge, 2017), 46.
2. For the formal version of the argument, see Oppy, “Logical Arguments,” 54.
3. On the strategy of criticizing “generic theism,” see Del Kiernan-Lewis, “The Problem of Evil: Moral Constraints and Philosophical Commitments,” in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van Inwagen (Eerdmans, 2004), 75–80.
4. This approach is illustrated in J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (InterVarsity Academic, 2003), 548–49.
5. J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God (Clarendon, 1982), 150.
6. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 2nd ed.(Macmillan, 2010), 215.
7. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 298–306.
8. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 325–26.
9. The distinction is drawn from J. Christian Beker, Suffering & Hope: The Biblical Vision and the Human Predicament (Eerdmans, 1994).
10. David Kelsey, Imagining Redemption (Westminster John Knox, 2005), 53–54.
11. See Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil (Continuum, 2006), 129–35.
12. Chad V. Meister, Evil: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2nd ed. (Bloomsbury, 2018), 53–55.
13. See Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams (Hackett, 1993).
14. Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Eerdmans, 1974), 34–35.
15. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 45–53.
16. In other words, the free will defense would pass the traditional principle of double effect in moral theology, while the soul-making theodicy would not.
17. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 31.
18. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 57–59.
19. John Swinton, Raging with Compassion: Pastoral Responses to the Problem of Evil(Eerdmans, 2007), 17–28.
20. Terrence W. Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy (Georgetown, 1991), 94.
21. Gustavo Gutiérrez, On Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Orbis, 1987), 56–66.
22. David B. Burrell, Deconstructing Theodicy: Why Job Has Nothing to Say to the Puzzle of Suffering (Brazos, 2008), 88.
23. Paul Draper, “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” in God and the Problem of Evil, ed. William L. Rowe (Blackwell, 2001), 180–202.
24. John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problem of Evil (Crossway, 2004), 358–60.
25. See Daniel Howard-Snyder, Michael Bergmann, and William L. Rowe, “An Exchange on the Problem of Evil,” in God and the Problem of Evil, ed. William L. Rowe (Blackwell, 2001), 131–36.
26. Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Cornell, 1999), 26.
27. Adams, Horrendous Evils, 166–67.
28. Swinton, Raging with Compassion, 79–80.
29. See Emmanuel Katongole, Born from Lament: The Theology and Politics of Hope in Africa (Eerdmans, 2017), 63.
30. Jennifer Baldwin, Trauma-Sensitive Theology: Thinking Theologically in the Era of Trauma (Cascade, 2018), 22.