You Are Your Body: Human Beings as Embodied Persons

The proper starting point for any discussion of human beings is, What is a person? Numerous answers have been proposed by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, philosophers, neurophysiologists, biblical scholars, church leaders, and theologians, all trying to answer the question, What does it mean for me to be a person? My proposed answer is: I am my body.

2 perspectives on the human person

Views about the human person generally fall into one of two categories.

1. Dualism

Dualism is the view which holds that human beings are complex, consisting of both a material aspect (a body) and an immaterial aspect (a soul or a spirit, or both a soul and a spirit).

For example, the philosopher Plato (428–347 BC) considered the human body as a tomb or prison from which the human soul must escape to achieve its purpose.

The philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BC) proposed the framework of hylomorphism, from hyle, “matter” (what human beings are made of) and morphē, “form” (the principle that organizes matter into human beings). Hylomorphism means that a human being is a single entity consisting of two principles: one that is spiritual (a soul, or form) and one that is corporeal (a body, or matter). For Aristotle, the soul is the form of the body.

The early Church Father Irenaeus (130–202 AD) established trichotomy, the view that human nature consists of the three elements of body, soul, and spirit.¹ He based his view on 1 Thessalonians 5:23.

Another early Church Father, Tertullian (160–240 AD), disagreed with Irenaeus and instead developed dichotomy, the view that human nature consists of two elements, the one being material (the body) and the other being immaterial (the soul or spirit).² He argued against a distinction between the latter two elements, underscoring the impossibility of separating the activity of the soul from the activity of the spirit.

One of the most influential philosophers, René Descartes (1596–1650), affirmed substance dualism, the view that human nature is composed of two very different substances: the body (an extended substance) and the soul or mind (a thinking substance).³ These two substances are completely distinct and function differently: The human body, like a machine, is subject to the laws of nature, and the human soul is completely free.

2. Monism

Monism, on the other hand, holds that human beings are simple, consisting of either a material aspect (a body) or an immaterial aspect (a soul or spirit).

For instance, idealism or immaterial monism is the view that human nature is not complex but simple, being ultimately immaterial. Examples include:

1. The idealism of George Berkeley, who maintained that the physical world exists as bundles of ideas in the mind of God and in human minds.
2. German idealism, which emphasized the mind-dependent nature of all that exists. People cannot know “things in themselves,” but only as those things appear to them.⁴

Materialism, materialistic monism, or physicalism is the view that human nature is simple rather than complex, being ultimately material. It maintains that “higher level” human elements (for example, religious pursuits, affection for others, the sense of human purpose) are reducible to “lower level” human elements, all of which are physical.⁵ It is reflected in naturalistic evolution, which attributes the origin and development of the universe to physical processes exclusively.

Non-reductive physicalism, another version of the above monistic view, combines physicalism—the ultimate foundation of human beings is the brain, central nervous system, and other physical components—with a non-reductive twist: These physical elements give rise to consciousness, agency, faith, moral thinking, and other non-physical properties (still, these are not aspects of the soul, which this view denies), which in turn can causally influence the physical foundation of persons.

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The Christian rejection of monism

Christian theological anthropology rejects all forms of monism, for various reasons.

First, it rejects idealism, because God has created a real/physical world that is populated by real/physical image bearers who are rescued by the Son of God, who took on real/physical human nature, and whose hope is to live eternally as real/physical resurrected Christians in a real/physical new heaven and new earth (see Gen 1:1–25; Gen 1:26–31; Phil 2:5–8; Heb 2:14–18; 1 Cor 15:42–49; Rev 21–22).

Second, it rejects reductive physicalism, because:

1. It eliminates human freedom, as all decisions and actions are completely determined by physical processes (biological determinism).
2. It destroys the moral responsibility of self-conscious human agents, as they are not the cause of their decisions and actions, which are instead produced by physical causes.

Third, it rejects non-reductive physicalism, because:

1. It denies the existence of a continuing personal identity after death in the intermediate state—which is a biblically taught and traditionally held Christian doctrine (e.g., 2 Cor 5:1–10)—because this view holds there can be no such thing as an immaterial or disembodied person.
2. Scripture affirms that human nature is complex, consisting of, for example, “soul and body” (Matt 10:28).

But then what is the preferred type of dualism?

This passage (Matt 10:28) prompts us to embrace some form of dualism: Human nature consists of both an immaterial element and a material element. But what variety of dualism is to be preferred?

The Platonic view must be wrong as it disparages the material element of human beings, viewing the body as significantly inferior to the soul, even considering it inherently evil. But as noted above, God’s physical creation, embodied image bearers, the incarnate Son, the promise of a physical resurrection, and eternal life in a physically restored creation contradict any diminishing and demeaning of the human body.

As for trichotomy and dichotomy, both stand opposed to monism and at their core are dualistic: human nature is both material and immaterial. As for this last element, whether that immaterial aspect is actually the soul or the spirit, or both a soul and a spirit, is a secondary matter. Additionally, this point is quite debatable, particularly because Scripture itself provides no definition of “soul” and “spirit” and how to differentiate between the two.

Descartes’s substance dualism struggles with two matters:

1. The identification of human beings with their rational mind such that their body has nothing to do with their identity.⁶
2. The question of how these two completely different substances can ever interact with one another.⁷

Any dualistic variety that significantly distances the material and immaterial aspects of human nature is incorrect. Hylomorphism, then, presents itself as an overarching dualistic framework for our consideration.

Hylomorphism: considering 2 varieties

While there are many versions of hylomorphism, I focus on two large subcategories, one that focuses on the immaterial aspect, or soul, and the second that focuses on the material aspect, or body.⁸

Prioritizing the soul

As representative of the (more) traditional type of hylomorphic dualism, Joshua Farris prioritizes the immaterial aspect (morphē, “form” or “soul”).

His biblical support includes an appeal to the distinction between “dust” (the body) and “spirit” (“breath” or “life,” that is, the soul; Eccl 12:7), explaining that the passage “presupposes this understanding that humans are soul body compounds.”⁹

As for the priority of the immaterial over the material aspects, Farris notes Mary’s praise—“My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God my Savior” (Luke 1:46–47)—and concludes that the subject or agent of her praising God is “neither her body nor the parts of her body. She is, arguably, something other than her body, or at least something higher than the body she inhabits.”¹⁰

Farris’s view is not without its difficulties. Examining Ecclesiastes 12:7 closer, the distinction is not between the “dust” as the body and the “spirit” as the soul. Rather, the latter reference is to (even as Farris notes) “the life that is given … to the body to make it alive,” the energizing principle or life force that courses through every living thing (Gen 1:30; 7:22), which is not a personal soul.¹¹

As for Mary’s praise, Luke 1:46–47 can simply be phrased, “I magnify the Lord and rejoice in God my Savior.” This rendition is certainly less poetic, but it is metaphysically true if Mary is the acting subject in all her offerings of praise to God.

Prioritizing the body

As another representative of hylomorphic dualism, I emphasize the material aspect (hyle, “matter” or “body”). I call my proposal the “embodied person” view and ground it on the thesis that the proper state of human existence is embodiment. Provocatively yet properly, I affirm “I am my body,” because my bodily composition is necessary for my very existence between my conception and my death. I cannot live in this earthly life without my body.

Please note what I don’t affirm: “I am only my body” or “I am identical with my body.”¹² Dismissing those errors, and by a basic and direct experience of my own embodiment, I affirm “I am my body” in this sense: I am who I am principally in virtue of the fact that I have the body that I have,¹³ and if I switched bodies with someone else, I would be a different person altogether.

The importance of human embodiment is also confirmed by the Bible’s hope of the resurrection of our bodies when Jesus Christ returns (e.g., 1 Cor 15; Phil 3:20–21; 1 Thess 4:13–18). If the the form of hylomorphism that prioritizes the soul is correct, then believers who have died and exist as souls in heaven with the Lord in the intermediate state are just fine; one questions what advantage there is to their bodily resurrection. But if the hylomorphism that emphasizes the body is correct, and the proper state of human existence is embodiment, then believers who are disembodied persons in the intermediate state:

1. Are not fully human (they lack the material aspect of human nature),
2. are not and cannot be fully saved (God saves his people holistically; e.g., 1 Cor 6:13–14), and
3. are not and cannot be fully conformed to the image of Christ, who is the God-man (and, thus, embodied forever).

This view also comports well with Paul’s shuddering at the prospect of being disembodied after his death—he uses the powerful images of being “naked” and “unclothed” (2 Cor 5:1–10)—because it underscores that disembodied existence in the intermediate state is abnormal, and not the way it’s supposed to be.

Bodily resurrection, in contrast, wonderfully transforms disembodied people so that they are fully human, fully saved, and fully conformed to Christ’s image: This is our ultimate hope as his disciples!

Conclusion

In conclusion, we’ve explored the question, What is a person? by discussing two major categories in answering it: dualism and monism. We dismissed monism in general and its several varieties in particular, noting its many problems. We outlined dualism and its several varieties and landed on hylomorphism, ultimately focusing on two versions: Joshua Farris’s view that prioritizes the immaterial aspect (morphē, “form” or “soul”), and my “embodied person” view that emphasizes the material aspect (hyle, “matter” or “body”).

If we are our body, then we can wrestle with the consequences of being implicated in our body as it becomes sick or injured. And we can avoid the mistake of locating sin in our body, viewing our body as an impediment to our sanctification, struggling with body image, and/or longing to escape our body.

Gregg Allison’s recommended resources for further study

• Timothy C. Tennent, For the Body: Recovering a Theology of Gender, Sexuality, and the Human Body

Related content

• What Does It Mean to Be Human? Theological Anthropology
• Sometimes Less Is Just Less: Contending for Dichotomy over Monism
• Sown Natural, Raised Spiritual: The (Nevertheless) Physical Resurrection Body
• What Is the Spiritual Body in 1 Corinthians 15?
• As I Live and Breathe: “Soul” and “Spirit” in Christian Physicalism

1. Trichotomy derives from τριχη (trichē), “threefold”; and τεμνω (temnō), “to cut”; thus, a division into three parts.
2. Dichotomy derives from διχη (dichē), “twofold”; and τεμνω (temnō), “to cut”; thus, a division into two parts.
3. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1984). Descartes published two editions: the Latin edition in 1641 and a first French edition in 1647.
4. Technically speaking, the first example is metaphysical idealism and the second is epistemological idealism, which is the opposite of realism/realist epistemology, that is, what is known and seen are objects as they really are, as outside and independent of one’s perception.
5. Lynne Rudder Baker, Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2013), 6. See also Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
6. As Descartes expressed his view, “I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks, that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason. … I am not that structure of limbs which is called a human body.” René Descartes, Meditation 6.78, in Meditations on First Philosophy: In Which the Existence of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body Are Demonstrated, trans. Ronald A. Cress, 3rd ed. (Hackett, 1993), 51.
7. Descartes’s own answer—the extended substance and the thinking substance connect at the pineal gland—is ingenuous and unsubstantiated physiologically. Descartes, Meditation 6.78; René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul 31 and 34, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoohoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 3 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1989–1991), 1:340, 341. The pineal gland is an endocrine gland located in the brain’s center between the right and left lobes; it does not do what Descartes proposed.
8. The following discussion reflects a more extensive treatment in Gregg Allison, “The Embodied Person View: Why I Am My Body, and Not Just My Soul,” Christ Over All (blog), January 6, 2025, https://christoverall.com/article/concise/the-embodied-person-why-i-am-my-body-not-just-my-soul/.
9. Joshua R. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology (Baker Academic, 2020), 20.
10. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 22–23.
11. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 20. I concur with his first two points (dust = “body”; spirit/breath = “the enlivening principle”) but disagree with his identification of breath with the soul. If all living things possess the breath of life (Gen 1:30; 7:22), then do all living things (e.g., cats and elephants) have souls?
12. The first affirmation, “I am only my body,” is contradicted by Scripture, which (as noted above) supports dualism. The second affirmation, “I am identical with my body,” which (reductive and non-reductive) physicalism affirms, is monism, which is dismissed above.
13. Justin E. H. Smith, “Introduction,” in Embodiment: A History, ed. Justin E. H. Smith (Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.